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Abstract	  
Too-big-to-fail has been a subject of controversy and has gained much attention in the course 
of the sub-prime financial crisis 2007-2009. Subjects related under this topic for instance are 
usually about the excessive risk taken by the government, and moral hazard. In this paper, we 
perform an analysis to examine the existence of too-big-to-fail impact on the banking sector 
in Switzerland during the financial crisis. By implementing a structural model to value the 
CDS contracts, and thus compare the model estimates with market observation. Deviation 
between model estimates and market data indicates the asymmetric expectations between 
shareholders and creditors. Since government bailout tends to favor creditors, thus the stock-
implied model estimates will be less affected. As we expected, overestimation of model 
predicted CDS spreads are found for banks in Switzerland, where the magnitude differs by 
government intervention. Our results comply with the theory that under government bailout, 
the expected default probability diverges between shareholders and creditors, which is a sign 
of having too-big-to-fail impact. 
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1 Introduction	  
“A too-big-to-fail firm is one whose size, complexity, interconnectedness, and critical 
functions are such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into liquidation, the rest of 
the financial system and the economy would face severe adverse consequences” 
- Bernanke B.S (2010).  
Banks have for centuries failed, many unnoticed and others capture attention of the public and 
policymakers. The banks that get noticed are the ones that are large in size and play a 
significant part in the financial system. A bankruptcy can affect not only the financial system 
but also other financial institutions and the economic order. The term “too-big-to-fail” 
describes insolvent banks that are supported by government interventions even though they 
are not automatically entitled to receive the funding. A significant reason is to protect the 
uninsured creditors from losing part or the whole sum that has been invested into the bank. 
When creditors of too-big-to-fail banks expect government supports, their monitoring of the 
banks activities reduces which can create a platform for the banks to take on excessive risk by 
increasing the loans and unnecessary costs. This application is more known as the Moral 
Hazard problem and can lead to billions of dollars lost in income for countries because of the 
increased risk taken by too-big-to-fail banks. Stern and Feldman (2004) emphasized a couple 
of years before the crisis the importance of decreasing the expectations creditors have on too-
big-to-fail protection in order to minimize the future damage on the financial stability. They 
also argued that the too-big-to-fail problem has only increased during the last years due to 
consolidation in the banking industry and the advances in the technology. Technology has 
allowed larger banks to take on a more significant payment system and has given the 
incitements to rely on uninsured wholesale funding. They also emphasize that some banks 
have increased in complexity and thus have become “too-complex-to-fail”. 
The last financial crisis during 2007-2009 raised the concern of the too big to fail issue, 
especially when the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 transpired. Governments 
and central banks joined in force to save the financial system and tried to stop the spread of 
financial contagion. When a larger financial institution is in distress the government´s main 
priority is to avoid default. Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2011) illuminate that creditors 
are prioritized and honoured while shareholders are uncertain of their outcome. Simply put, 
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government interventions are mainly focused on creditors and do not favour shareholders. A 
clear example occurred when JP Morgan Chase acquired the investment bank Bear Stearns 
during May in 2008, where the Federal Reserve granted a USD 30 billion loan to JP Morgan. 
The reason for this was to ensure that JP Morgan was able to cover the Bear Stearns´s risky 
assets. Since this was considered by the market as a rescue plan for the creditors of Bear 
Stearns, it resulted into a mismatch between the credit market and stock market of the market 
price of default risk, the default risk on the stock market increased and exceeded the risk on 
the credit market (Schweikhard & Tsesmelidakis, 2011). Kaufman (2002) argued in an early 
stage that disagreements about the definitions of the term and thus the calculations of the 
costs and profits make this issue hard to solve. In line with Völz & Wedow (2011), Barth & 
Davis (2008) and Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga (2010) investigated what impact a bank´s size 
and government in despair has on the stock price and the CDS spreads. Yu (2005) tried to 
conduct a research by looking at different volatilities and their impact on the CDS Spread. 
Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2011) use calibration on the data before the crisis and 
underline the misfit between the credit market and equity market during the crisis, which is 
indicated by the higher stock-implied default risk. 
The term too-big-to-fail is used to explain the fact that when large financial institutions are 
trapped in distress, government bailout tends to occur in order to prevent a chain effect of 
catastrophes due to the large interconnectedness (Schubert, 2011). The aim of this study is to 
examine the existence of the too-big-to-fail impact on the Swiss banking sector during the 
recent subprime crisis. Switzerland, as many other countries was deeply affected by the 
financial crises. Especially, the two largest financial institutions in Switzerland, UBS and 
Credit Suisse, had difficulties during the crisis but in different ways.  
The analysis is performed by comparing the CDS spreads estimated using a structural model 
with the actual market spreads. Credit valuation is based upon the structural approach for 
modeling CDS spreads, and estimated from the Merton (1974) model, which values equity 
and debt as contingent claims with the firm value. Based on the Merton framework, the 
CreditGrades model utilizes firm fundamentals with only balance sheet and stock market data 
to calculate theoretical CDS spreads. According to Byström (2006) the model is because of 
that more straightforward. The observed deviations in this setting indicate different 
expectations on default probabilities between shareholders and creditors, and thus is an 
evidence of the existence of too-big-to-fail impact.  
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The uniqueness of this paper is that the method used makes it possible to detect the impact of 
too-big-to-fail, by observing the deviations between modelled and market observed CDS 
spreads. In addition, very few studies were done using the CreditGrades model and thus make 
this paper more interesting to write about. 
In section 2, we start with a review on the previous literature that has been done on the too-
big-to-fail issue and the structural model. Followed by the next section with an overview of 
too-big-to-fail and its impact on banking sectors. Section 4 gives a general picture about the 
Swiss banking system with a focus on the two largest banks, UBS and Credit Suisse. Sections 
5 and Section 6 provide the methodology of this paper, starting with explaining the 
CreditGrades model, as well as the data collection and model implementation method. At last, 
the results are presented in Section 7 while conclusion and further research in Section 8. 
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2 Literature	  Review	  
This	   section	   of	   the	   paper	   reviews	   previous	   literature	   on	   topics	   about	   the	   too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail	  
issue	  and	  the	  structure	  model.	  That	  provides	  some	  background	  knowledge	  on	  the	  two	  most	  
important	  concepts	  of	  this	  paper.	  
2.1 Too-­‐Big-­‐To-­‐Fail	  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the too-big-to-fail problem intensified and the interest to 
find a resolution for insolvent large financial institutions increased. Kaufman (2002) argued 
that too-big-to-fail impact is hard to resolve because there are disagreements about the 
definitions of the term and thus the calculations of the costs and profits.  
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, Stern and Feldman (2004) wrote a book on the issue 
of too-big-to-fail. The following quote summarizes the attention of the book: “Despite some 
progress, out central warning is that not enough has been done to reduce creditors´ 
expectations of too-big-to-fail protection.” The reason for this warning lies behind the fact 
that when creditors believe that they will be bailed out by the government there is less 
incentive for them to monitor the banks and their activities. Furthermore, when this kind of 
market discipline is relaxed, banks may engage in excessive risk taking actions. The authors 
also alert that the too-big-to-fail impact has been growing and has become more severe 
because of the growth in size of banks, more complex operations, more concentrated assets in 
the industry and certain policy trends that can contribute to the severity. Later on, Mishkin 
(2005) wrote a review on the book where he argued that Stern and Feldman (2004) 
overestimated the issue with too-big-to-fail because the legislation that was implemented 
during the 1990s made it less likely to occur.  
When it comes to credit derivatives, Yu (2006) conducted a research on which volatility 
measure is more informative, historical or option-implied volatility, once the CDS contracts 
have to be priced. They noticed that option-implied volatility offers more significant results 
than historical volatility for time-series regressions. The CreditGrades model, as one of the 
structural models, was used in order to illustrate the non-linear relationship between CDS 
spreads and volatility. The results showed that implied volatility is beneficial when it comes 
to companies with lower credit rating, greater option volume and companies with a significant 
increase in CDS due to a credit event. Another paper that tried to stipulate the structural 
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model of Merton (1974) was Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2011). They applied the 
calibration method on the data before the crisis and indicated that there was a misfit between 
the credit market and equity market during the crisis, which can be seen in higher stock-
implied default risk. Shareholders are exposed to higher risk since the government puts its 
focus on saving the debt of the bank, and this entails that creditors have a lower risk. This 
creates a gap between the effects of default on the two markets, but when the calibration 
lowers the default boundary as a sign of support from the government, the two markets can be 
connected.  
In Völz and Wedow (2011) paper they emphasized that under too-big-to-fail impact, the CDS 
spreads decrease as the bank size increases, as a consequence of an inflated probability of 
bailout. The CDS spreads can decrease up to two basis points when a growth in mean of one 
percentage occurs.  Even though, this can be seen as a trivial reduction, the problem occurs 
when two superior banks merge, and the size increases extensively. Another aspect of the 
paper touches upon the issue of banks that are already too-big-to-rescue. Even though this can 
be seen as something positive for the managers it can have a huge impact on the fiscal budget 
and the overall financial stability. Solutions need to be created in order to reduce the 
probability of default or manage the failure without colossal costs on the society. A more 
recent paper that positions its focus on size is the editorial of Barth and Schnabel (2012), 
which argued that bank size is not a good indicator of systematic risk, the reason for that is 
since it does not take into account interconnectedness, correlation and the economic situation. 
With the help of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) they were able to control systematic risk 
using the CoVaR measurement. Their theory on too-systematic-to-fail is supported by their 
results, which specify that when a bank influences systematic risk it provides negative effects 
on the CDS spreads. They also found that size does not have an effect on the CDS spreads. 
The terms “too-systematic-to-fail” and “too-big-to-save” became an important factor in their 
contribution.  
In line with Völz and Wedow (2011) as well as Barth and Schnabel (2012), Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010) discussed in their paper what impact the size of the bank and a 
government distress can have on the stock prices and the CDS spreads. The financial crisis of 
2008 had large negative impacts on the countries and governments, which raises the question 
if governments that are in despair are able to rescue future failing banks and their creditors. 
Their first outcome specifies that a bank´s market-to-book ratio is negatively connected to the 
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size and the systematic risk, which suggests that some banks have grown too big to be rescued. 
The second outcome provides that CDS spreads are negatively linked to countries fiscal 
balance, so if a country does not have strong public finances it will be harder to rescue a bank 
on the verge of bankruptcy.  
2.2 Structural	  Model	  
There are three different models that have been used to value the credit derivatives. First in 
line is the model provided by (Alman, 1968), where he conducted a research based upon 
companies that have defaulted and companies that survived. The analysis is made on 
companies’ right before the default in order to identify characteristics of the company. The 
other model is called the reduced model where the information is extracted from real credit 
prices in order to receive their default probabilities. This model gives information on how the 
market looks like at individual credit level but does not explain the reason behind the 
probability of default. Nevertheless, it compares different structures of credit risk but cannot 
provide information on the price if the market does not exist.  The third model, central in this 
paper, is the structured model that was originally derived from Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1974). The Merton model describes that the default is present when the firm´s asset 
drops below a barrier, which indicates that the structure of the individual firm and the asset 
volatility defines the default. To be able to evaluate the model one must estimate the volatility 
and the market value of the firm´s asset. The parameters used in the model can only be 
estimated for companies with publicly traded equity, which is not always available (Smithson, 
2003).  
Within the group of structural models, RiskMetrics Group created the CreditGrades Model in 
2002 (Finger et al., 2002), which is the model that will be implemented in this paper. The 
model is set apart from the other models described due to two reasons. First, other models aim 
to separate default companies from healthy companies and measure the precise probability of 
default. Second, the time reference is more present in the CreditGrades model since the 
estimates are done when a firm´s credit is getting reduced.  
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3 Too-­‐Big-­‐To-­‐Fail	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  address	  the	  too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail	  impact	  on	  Swiss	  banking	  sector;	  
therefore	  it	  is	  important	  to	  have	  some	  insights	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail,	  this	  section	  
starts	  with	  a	  historical	  review	  followed	  with	  an	  European	  perspective	  and	  eventually	  its	  
application	  on	  banking	  system.	  
3.1 Historical	  Review	  
Too-big-to-fail is a term that has repeatedly been used in order to describe in which way bank 
regulators deal with banks that are in despair. In 1984, the bank Continental Illinois National 
in Chicago was the first major bank that received the term “too-big-to-fail.” Continental 
Illinois National in Chicago was the seventh largest bank in the US at that time and had 
interconnectedness with more than 2,200 other banks via interbank deposits and Fed funds. 
During that period, regulators in the US applied what was before used on smaller banks to 
prevent the banks from collapse: selling its assets, insuring deposits by allowing another bank 
to take over at par and by protecting all uninsured depositors and creditors against losses, and 
as a result, banks survived from bankruptcy. Since the bank was large in size and had an 
extensive interconnectedness with other banks, the regulators thought that allowing the bank 
to fail would cause a chain reaction and affect other banks and furthermore the financial 
market and the macro-economy. In addition, the regulators provided funds to the parent 
company of the Continental via equity capital without any concern on the consequences it 
entailed. As a result, the banks operated as normal but under Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) control and a new senior management (Kaufman, 2002).  
A couple of years later the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) experienced 
significant losses and liquidity issues because of the consequences of the Asian and Russian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998. The hedge fund had to be rescued by larger banks under the 
support of the Federal Reserve of New York in September 1998. The failure of LTCM 
indicated an important factor that had to be considered; even though the hedge fund was not 
considered to be large (assets amounted up to USD100 billion), many researchers thought it 
would have had catastrophic consequences if they filed for bankruptcy because of the chain 
reaction it would have caused (Goldstein & Véron, 2011).  
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3.2 The	  Perspective	  of	  Europe	  
The historical and political foundation of the too-big-to-fail impact looks a bit different within 
the European Union. The continent consists of independent centralized-nation states with 
substantial financial integration where the national government encourages a strong 
autonomous financial sector that can be strong enough to be compared with the largest 
financial sectors in the world. Their aim is to protect and foster banks in order to prevent the 
disappearance or foreign takeover, which is done by consolidation or nationalization. A clear 
example took place during 1870s when the Deutsche Bank in Berlin was created to encounter 
the large British banks that headed the international transactions. During the World War II 
and in the aftermath of the Great Depression, the government such as Italy in 1933 and France 
in 1946 nationalized many financial institutions in the banking sector (Goldstein & Véron, 
2011). There is a significant difference between US and European Union when it comes to 
attitudes towards bank failures. In the US, the tolerance for corporate insolvency is bigger 
than in the European countries, and they are more protective on corporate executives and 
employees. However, in Europe banking failure triggers many negative memories, for 
instance in Europe, the last wave of bank default occurred in 1931 during the Second World 
War. Therefore, if a bank is in despair among European countries, it is supported at all costs 
even if the bank is small. The US also consists of many non-bank financial institutions, which 
provide financial services such as asset management or broker dealing. While within the 
European Union banks accommodate for most of the financial services. 
In order to grasp the term too-big-to-fail more correctly one has to be able to define what is 
meant by “too-big.” There is no particular measure or bank attribute that provides a 
straightforward answer, but the level of systematic risk possessed by the bank has given better 
guidelines. A couple of years ago the European Central Bank (ECB) identified in their 
framework what it considers as large and complex banking groups (LCBGs). The aim of their 
framework was to prove that the traditional analysis of asset size in the balance sheet was not 
enough to explain the term of too-big-to-fail and the interconnections in the financial sector. 
ECB argued that it was also important to include activities that banks were engaged in, 
especially the ones not included in the balance sheet.  (Goldstein & Véron, 2011) states that 
the ECB proposed 19 different key factors that had to be taken into consideration when 
defining the size of the bank. Although, many more factors were in fact involved, the asset 
size alone was discovered to be a sufficient measure for LCBGs. With  𝑅! of 0.93 between 
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total assets and the compound index it was proven that size of the assets provided enough 
information to define the scale of “too-big”.  
Through out the years many European banks increased their size via international funding, 
well enough to be compared to the respective country’s GDP. A small country like Iceland 
was able to have a banking system that was nine times greater than the country’s GDP in 
2007. Switzerland and United Kingdom had during 2008 reached a size that was 6.3 and 5.5 
times their countries’ GDP.  Banks in Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland and Netherlands 
had reached the amount of liabilities that was two times their GDP. Thereby if assets are 
compared to the home country´s GDP, the European banks are more likely to be considered 
too-big-to-fail. This indicates that the too-big-to-fail impact is more present in the European 
Union than in the US. Even though there is much integration between the European Union 
countries and the aim is to create one single financial market, in most cases when a bank 
defaults the government in the home country will have to intervene, not the European Union. 
(Goldstein & Véron, 2011).  
Iceland, a small country in Europe that did not want to participate in the European Union 
suffered a great deal during the crisis. The three of the largest banks in Iceland filed for 
bankruptcy, and the consequences were catastrophic. The damage after the financial crisis 
was estimated to be 800% of the 2006 (GDP) in financial assets. It was clear that the three 
banks possessed a large enough portfolio of (toxic) assets to be declared too-big-to-fail. The 
results generated after this bankruptcy created a chain of events that worsened the economy 
further. Different countries that did not want to get affected froze Icelandic assets, the 
Icelandic Kronor fell fast from a value of 60iKr/USD to approximately 140iKr/USD; the 
Icelandic stock market dropped by 90% and the GDP dropped fast. The country had fallen 
into a recession (Schubert, 2011). 
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3.3 The	  Banking	  System	  	  The definition of the term states that failure is when a financial institution does not succeed in 
meeting its contractual obligations to a third party. Failure has a different implication in 
banking compared to the corporate world. In the world of corporates, the default process is 
seen as an isolated bankruptcy while in finance there can be more consequences than just an 
individual institution that fails due to the systematic risk connected with banks. In the case 
that the financial institution reaches a point beyond insolvency there are three options that can 
be carried out. First, is the “resolution regime” which involves transferring the bank’s assets 
and economic rights to the public entity which in return decides what obligations will be 
honored or not. The other option is more well-known as “bailout” where the government steps 
in and repays the creditors, which in times can lead to nationalization (transfer of ownership 
to the state) of the institution without closing down the business continuity. The last option to 
consider is “regulatory forbearance” where the authorities are in denial of the institutions 
insolvency. This leads to wishful thinking that the crisis will disappear or become less severe 
with time (Goldstein & Véron, 2011). 
One might ask why too-big-to-fail is considered to be a problem and where the issues lie from 
the economic point of view. An issue that rises from larger banks is the fact that they can 
distort competition. Banks in the US that have assets that are worth more than USD 100 
billion can reduce their funding costs more than 70 basis points compared to the smaller 
banks. Another problem that occurs is the fact that the public lowers trust in the fairness of the 
system and undermine responsibility and accountability in the capitalist economies. Larger 
institutions also worsen systematic risk by not managing their risk properly and create a 
liability for the government that is providing the support (Goldstein & Véron, 2011). A 
different term closely related to too-big-to-fail is moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when 
creditors of larger financial institutions expect the government to provide support to their 
loans, so that they will pay less attention to the behavior of the financial institutions or select 
institutions that are cautious. Financial institutions on the other hand realize that their 
creditors monitor their behavior less and are more willing to take on riskier projects and act 
more irresponsibly than if they did not have the support from the government. This type of 
behavior can lead to wasted resources and a high chance of failure. Another dimension of 
moral hazard is underlined in the implication that bigger banks maintain lower capital ratios 
than smaller banks (Moosa, 2010). 
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4 The	  Banking	  Sector	  in	  Switzerland	  
Switzerland,	   a	   small	   country	   in	   Europe	   with	   a	   strong	   banking	   sector	   and	   their	  
determination	  to	  not	  join	  the	  EU,	  however,	  was	  massively	  suffered	  from	  the	  financial	  crisis	  
started	   in	   the	   US.	   In	   this	   section,	   we	   describe	   some	   general	   introduction	   about	   their	  
banking	  sector	  and	  the	  two	  largest	  banks	  in	  Switzerland:	  UBS	  and	  Credit	  Suisse.	  
The Swiss have always taken pride in their country being independent, having a sustainable 
banking sector and the desire to not be part of the European Union (EU).  They chose to be 
neutral during several wars but held strong defensive army at all times. Attracting foreign 
investors has always been important in order to maintain both a political and economic level 
of strength. Even though the country was able to stand on its own feet, the impact of the 
global financial crisis between 2007 and 2009 had undesirable effects on the largest bank in 
the country, UBS.   
Events that occur in the US can have a big impact on other countries due to the globalization 
today. Switzerland, even though neutral, was not able to avoid the consequences of the 
financial crises that affected the whole world.  
As in most countries, the Swiss banking system is built upon a private banking sector and the 
central bank, Swiss National Bank (SNB). SNB can be compared to the US Federal Reserve 
bank (FED) where both are in charge of the monetary policy. The Central bank acts as a 
“bank for banks,” which means that other banks can among other things hold accounts and 
takeout loans from the Central bank.  
Regional banks and the two larger institutions UBS and Credit Suisse together create the 
Swiss private banking sector. UBS is the largest bank and following right after is the Credit 
Suisse bank. When Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank merged during 1998, they 
created what is today known as UBS.  The bank grew and developed during the years and 
needed to invest abroad. They increased their investments further when they acquired the US 
brokerage firm PaineWebber during 2000. Not long after the acquirement risk managers at 
UBS headquarters in Zurich studied the impact of the large amount of trades invested in the 
US mortgage securities. By the year 2002, USD24 billion had been invested into the US 
mortgage market. This was considered to be risky in the sense that the US mortgage market 
was very illiquid, which meant that it would be problematic to sell the securities in difficult 
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times. The subprime mortgage market in the US experienced difficulties already during 2006 
when the house prices began to dive (Schubert, 2011). At that point, the exposure that UBS 
had to the subprime mortgages was unknown and the bank even hoped to benefit from the fall. 
Due to their triple-A rating that they possessed by international agencies made it harder for 
the risk management to acknowledge the exposure they had. On the 9th of August 2007, the 
uncertainty of the magnitude of losses and write-offs had reached a different point. The 
liquidity had dried up on the interbank market, and the warning signals were official. SNB 
started to monitor the larger banks and their activities on the market. The crash of the global 
financial system, triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, added 
to the already severely distressed situation. The support from the SNB was inevitable in order 
to maintain the stability of the financial system and the Swiss national economy. By the 14th 
of October, UBS had officially requested protection from the Swiss National Bank (The Swiss 
Parliament , 2010). 
Since the largest institutions in the economy are so interconnected with other banks, the 
government did not allow UBS to file for bankruptcy because the whole economy would have 
been greatly hurt.  UBS was considered to be too-big-to-fail during the financial crisis. On the 
16th of October 2008, The Swiss National Bank created the Swiss National Bank Stability 
Fund (SNB-StabFund). This was an agreement with UBS where the SNB supplied UBS with 
money. In order to decrease the financial risk, UBS had to transfer USD 38.7 billion of toxic 
assets to a legal entity that was initiated by the SNB. UBS and Credit Suisse reduced the size 
of the trading portfolio and balance sheets and decreased the amount of risky positions. Credit 
Suisse managed to raise capital on their own, while UBS was forced to consider financial 
support from the public sector (Schubert, 2011). Credit Suisse managed to raise USD8.8 
billion from major global investors including Qatar authorities (Cowell, 2008). During the 
financial crisis between 2007 and 2009 banks that did not have the same exposure to the US 
mortgage securities managed to regain their financial stability in a much better way. The 
financial crisis raised the question whether a small country like Switzerland, was able to 
maintain stability on its own while being exposed to a large financial industry. 
Whether or not the Swiss economy would have experienced the same consequences as 
Iceland is hard to know but the concept of too-big-to-fail was more realistic for the regulators 
in Switzerland than in other European countries.   
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The consequences of the financial crisis made world leaders think about how to prevent this 
so that it does not repeat itself. The main question is; if a bank is too big to fail, is it too big to 
exist? The lesson learned from the aftermath is that the country should try to apply 
diversification and to not depend too much on a single bank. UBS and Credit Suisse are quite 
large in proportion compared to the Swiss economy. The Swiss GDP was estimated to a value 
of USD 488 billion during 2008, which can be compared to the USD 1.84 trillion that UBS 
held in worldwide assets (Schubert, 2011).  
Bailing out a bank in order to preserve a stable economy is not easily attained since public 
money is used. Taxpayers in Switzerland are affected, and so are other banks that have not 
obtained the support from the government since they had a different risk-adverse approach. 
The message sent out to the public and financial institutions was that risk is not that 
problematic because the government will provide support. Many regulators have expressed 
that “if they are too-big-to-fail, they are too-big” but restricting a banks size is not the solution 
either. If a country tries to prevent a bank from becoming too big, the ability to grow will be 
limited. This in return will create an unfair advantage on the international level between banks 
(Schubert, 2011).  
As soon as 2013 UBS had managed to repay the bailout loan since the toxic assets that were 
removed from the bank during the financial crisis became profitable. The bank was able to 
buy back the assets and define it in the News Business as “important step, which closes this 
chapter in the firm´s history with a positive outcome” (BBC News, 2013). 
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5 Linking	  the	  Credit	  and	  Equity	  Market	  
This	  section	  first	  introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  CDS	  and	  its	  importance	  on	  the	  credit	  market	  as	  
a	  measure	  of	   the	  credit	   risk.	   	  Then	  we	   introduce	  how	  a	  CDS	  contract	   is	  valued	  under	  an	  
arbitrage-­‐free	  condition,	  followed	  by	  some	  background	  knowledge	  and	  the	  advantages	  on	  
using	  the	  CreditGrades	  model.	  
5.1 Credit	  Default	  Swaps	  	  
When counterparties or borrowers have difficulties in fulfilling their obligations, it creates a 
credit risk for commercial banks. The credit risk can be seen in most financial activities and is 
therefore important to get managed accurately. Through the introduction of Credit Derivatives, 
these issues are more manageable since it creates financial contracts where the risk and the 
return of the underlying are transferred from one counterparty to another without actually 
owning the underlying asset.  The credit derivatives market has grown virtually during the last 
years since the global market is much more sensitive to the credit risk than interest rate or 
currency risk. During the beginning of the 21st century the credit derivatives market had a 
notional amount of USD 0.7 trillion and after only three years that amount increased to USD 
4.5 trillion. 
‘Credit Guarantees’ and ‘Credit Letters’ have been used in centuries, but they were contrary 
to credit derivatives between an issuer of the underlying and the guarantor. This can include 
more costs when the underlying is about to be sold. The credit derivative on the other hand 
minimizes the exposure towards counterparty without any funding changing place until a 
credit event occurs. When a credit event occurs, the buyer of the credit risk will transfer the 
fund to the seller. Hedge funds also use credit derivatives to hedge their trades, and non-
financial companies can use them for protection against suppliers and customers as well as 
traders in investment banks seek for arbitrage openings between the credit derivatives and the 
underlying bond and stock market.  
As the traditional credit market had many issues so that the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as a 
credit linked instrument was able to get around. The CDS separates the credit risk component 
from other risks such as foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk. Through the standardized 
contracts with different maturities and ability to take short positions, the liquidity becomes 
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more present. Investors are also able to buy or sell large arbitrary positions for the purpose of 
speculation or hedging. 
CDS market is nowadays the largest credit derivative market, a CDS contract, is in terms of 
providing the protection buyer an insurance against the certain type of credit events by the 
protection seller. In other words, CDS is a ‘bilateral credit derivative contract where two 
counterparties exchange credit risk’ (Hull, 2009). When the credit event occurs during the 
contract period, the protection buyer has the right to sell their bonds for the face value, the 
CDS’s notional principal, is hence compensated for the losses the buyer would otherwise 
suffer. The protection seller meanwhile receives periodic coupon in return, and the annual 
coupon received as a percentage of the notional principal is quoted in basis points (bps, a 
basis point is 0.01% percentage point), which is usually called the CDS spreads, which gives 
a value on the CDS contracts (Schweikhard & Tsesmelidakis, 2011). The contract terminates 
as soon as the credit event takes place, and thus no further payments will be induced.  
Instead of using bond yield spreads to measure credit risk, CDS spreads are guaranteed with 
distinctive advantages: CDS spreads provides more direct and ‘pure’ measure on the default 
risk. Since unlike bond spreads, CDS contract is less affected by short sale restrictions, 
liquidity and interest rate risk, which are commonly related with bond spreads ( (Ericsson, 
Reneby, & Wang, 2007); (Blanco, Brennan, & Marsh, 2005)). In addition, CDS are traded on 
standardized terms while flexibilities are applied to bond market to a larger extend. Last but 
the most important is that CDS market reacts to new information more rapidly when there are 
changes in the credit rating of the underlying company (Zhu, 2006). Therefore, our study 
chooses to use CDS spreads as a measure of the credit risk.  
5.2 CDS	  Valuation	  
The valuation of a CDS contract under arbitrage-free condition is estimated as: the present 
value of the periodic payment made by the protection buyer equals the present value of the 
notional principal, or the protection. Under this setting, the initial value of a CDS contract 
must equal to zero. The total cash flow can be summarized as below in terms of Net Present 
Value (NPV): 
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𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 1− 𝑅 ∗ 𝑝!!! − 𝑝! ∗ 𝑑! −!!!! 𝑠 ∗!!!! 𝑝!!! ∗ 𝑑! = 0 𝑠 Indicates the spreads paid.  
The NPV calculation for the cash flow includes both fee and contingent, which are weighted 
according to the survival probability and default probability respectively, and are discounted 
under the risk-free rate regime (Goldman Sachs FICC Credit Strategies, 2009). 
5.3 CDS	  Models	  
Besides the advantages of using CDS spreads, it also addresses the differences from stock and 
credit market on estimating default risk. Therefore by comparing model estimates on CDS 
contract with market data, indicates to what extent, the government intervention has impacts 
on the credit market, and thus address the too-big-to-fail impact. The model of our choice is 
the CreditGrades model, developed by RiskMetrics and Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs 
Group Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co, which provides a stock-market-implied price on CDS 
spreads. The model was first introduced in Finger et al. (2002) and explored further in Finger 
and Stamicar (2006). It belongs to the structural approach, and emanated from the Merton 
(1974) model, which values equity and debt as contingent claims with the firm value. By 
using only firm fundamental and equity market data, the estimation of CreditGrades model is 
more straightforward to implement (Byström, 2006). 
Another reason to choose CreditGrades model is that under the Merton (1974) model, the 
short-term spreads produced are too low comparing to real spreads. To correct this problem, 
the CreditGrades model introduces randomness in the default barrier, which allows the firm to 
get closer to the barrier than otherwise estimated (Finger et al. 2002). In fact, one could also 
incorporate jumps into the asset to capture randomness, as in the study from Zhou (2001). 
Another minor issue with Merton (1974) model is that, it only allows the event of default to 
occur at maturity, while under the CreditGrades model, default can occur at any time during 
the contract period (Löeffler & Posch, 2011), which reflects the reality better. 
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6 Methodology	  and	  Data	  Implication	  
The	  CreditGrades	  model	  was	  chosen	  for	  this	  study	  is	  because	  that	  it	  was	  proposed	  by	  some	  
large	  financial	  institutions	  and	  was	  efficient	  for	  measuring	  the	  credit	  risk.	  Therefore,	  this	  
section	   is	   contributed	   to	  describe	   the	  model	  as	  well	  as	   its	  parameters	  and	  data	   that	  are	  
needed	  to	  implement	  the	  model.	  
6.1 CreditGrades	  Model	  
The CreditGrades model is considered as one of the most commonly used commercial credit 
models for pricing CDS spreads, and as pointed out by the CreditGrades Technical Document 
(Finger et al., 2002), the purpose of the model is to ‘establish a robust but simple framework 
linking the credit and equity market’ by exploiting equity values and firm’s balance sheet 
information together under a set of standard assumptions (Byström, 2006). 
Intuitively, the model assumes 𝑉 as the firm’s asset value process on a per share basis follows 
a stochastic process: 
𝑑𝑉!𝑉! =   𝜎𝑑𝑊! +   𝜇!𝑑𝑡 
where 𝑊 is a standard Brownian motion, 𝜎 is the asset volatility, and 𝜇! is the asset drift.  
Initially the model sets 𝜇! = 0, because it assumes that the firm will try to remain at a steady 
level of leverage by varying the amount of debt issued in line with the variations in stock drift. 
In other words, the drift term is set to be zero in order to avoid arbitrage.  
The model defines the event of default as the first time firm’s asset 𝑉 crosses the default 
barrier, whereas the default barrier is the amount of assets remains at the firm in case of 
default. The term 𝐿 ∙ 𝐷, measures the default barrier numerically, where 𝐿 is the recovery rate 
on debt, and 𝐷 , the firm’s specific debt-per-share value. The most important is that 
randomness is introduced to the recovery rate in order to produce more realistic short-term 
CDS spreads, and is one of the prominent corrections of the CreditGrades model over the 
Merton model (Finger et al., 2002).  
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The randomness is modeled by introducing the term global recovery rate, which follows 
lognormal distribution with mean 𝐿 and standard deviation of 𝜆: 
𝐿 =   Ε𝐿 𝜆! = 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿) 
and thus 𝐿𝐷 =   𝐿𝐷𝑒!"!!!/! 
where 𝑍 is a standard normal random variable, and is independent of the Brownian motion 𝑊. 
Additionally, 𝑍 is initially unknown but reveals at the time of default. Most importantly, the 
random variable 𝑍 captures the uncertainty in the firm’s actual debt-per-share level, which 
makes the true level of 𝐿 not vary over time, and the default barrier can be hit unexpectedly.  
Accordingly, the assumptions of CreditGrades model can be illustrated by the figure below: 
 
 
Figure	  1:	  Asset	  Valuation	  for	  the	  CreditGrades	  Model	  
Source: reprinted form CreditGrades Technical Documents (Finger et al., 2002) 
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As pointed out in the figure above, 𝑉! is the initial asset value and the model assumes that 
default does not occur as long as  
𝑉!𝑒!!!!!!!/!   >   𝐿𝐷𝑒!"!!!/! 
The probability of survival for the firm at time t is measured by the probability that the asset 
value of the firm not hitting the barrier up to time t. To estimate the probability, a process is 
introduced: 
𝑋! =   𝜎𝑊! − 𝜆𝑍 − 𝜎!𝑡2 − 𝜆!2  
note that 𝑋! is normally distributed for 𝑡 ≥ 0, with 
Ε𝑋! =   −𝜎!2 𝑡 + 𝜆!/𝜎!  𝑉𝑎𝑟  𝑋! =   𝜎! 𝑡 + 𝜆!/𝜎!  
By following the process 𝑋, which gives a closed form solution for the survival probability 
before time t: 
𝑃 𝑡 =   𝜙 −𝐴!2 + log 𝑑𝐴! − 𝑑𝜙 −𝐴!2 + log 𝑑𝐴!  
where  𝑑 =   𝑉!𝑒!!𝐿𝐷  𝐴!! =   𝜎!𝑡 + 𝜆! 
and 𝜙  is the cumulative normal distribution. 
As can be seen, the closed form solution of survival probability does not have variable 𝑍 
included, producing the results of having non-zero probability of default at 𝑡 = 0, and thus an 
alternative method is to integrate the random variable 𝑍 . However, the CreditGrades 
Technical Document (Finger et al., 2002) claims that the differences by using the two 
methods are minor.   
Kiesel and Veraart (2008) on the contrary shows that when the debt-per-share level of a firm 
is considerably high, the difference between two methods are perceptable. And in this case, 
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the survival probability should be derived by using the exact formula containing the 
cumulative bivariate normal distribution: 
𝑃 𝑡 = 𝜙! − 𝜆2+ log 𝑑𝜆 ,−𝐴!2 + log 𝑑𝜆 ; 𝜆𝐴! − 𝜙! − 𝜆2+ log 𝑑𝜆 ,−𝐴!2 + log 𝑑𝜆 ;− 𝜆𝐴!  
where in this case 𝜙! is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution.  
The unique of using CreditGrades model is that it converts the survival probability into credit 
price, by using additional two parameters: the risk-free rate 𝑟 , and the recovery rate 𝑅.  To be 
notice that 𝑅 differs from 𝐿 to the extend that 𝑅 is the expected recovery rate on specific debt, 
while 𝐿 is the global recovery rate applies to the overall debt classes. Finger et al. (2002) sets 𝑅 to a fixed parameter with value of 0.5 based on historical data, with the reason further 
explained in the CreditGrades Technical Document. 
Eventually, the price of a CDS is valued by solving the continuously compounded spread 𝑐∗ 
under the no-arbitrage condition, which means that the present value of expected premium 
payments on a CDS must equal to the present value of expected loss payouts, when default 
occurs. 
𝑐∗ = 𝑟 1− 𝑅 1− 𝑃 0 + 𝑒!" 𝐺 𝑡 + 𝜉 − 𝐺 𝜉𝑃 0 − 𝑃 𝑡 𝑒!!" − 𝑒!"(𝐺( 𝑡 + 𝜉 − 𝐺 𝜉 ) 
where 𝜉 =   𝜆!/𝜎! and the function 𝐺 is given by 
𝐺 𝑢 =   𝑑!!!!𝜙 − log 𝑑𝜎 𝑢 − 𝑧𝜎 𝑢 + 𝑑!!!!!𝜙 − log 𝑑𝜎 𝑢 + 𝑧𝜎 𝑢  
with 𝑧 =    1/4+ 2𝑟/𝜎!. 
In order to implement the survival probability 𝑃(𝑡), it is necessary to link the model to market 
observations by calibrating the model parameters. The asset value at 𝑡 = 0 is  
𝑉! =   𝑆! + 𝐿𝐷 
with 𝑆! as the stock price at 𝑡 = 0. This also gives the total asset volatility: 
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𝜎 =   𝜎! 𝑆𝑆 + 𝐿𝐷 
by connecting the asset volatility to the equity volatility 𝜎!, which is observable and can be 
calculated using historical or implied volatility estimation methods. 
6.2 Data	  Description	  
Our study is designed to analyze the too-big-to-fail impact on the Swiss banking sector, but 
due to the limited availability of data, which in our case, CDS contracts are only available to 
the two largest banks in Switzerland: UBS and Credit Suisse. In addition, various data are 
collected from the banks within a time span of 2, Jul 2007 to 31, Mar 2010. This specific 
period was chosen to cover the recent sub-prime financial crisis and its aftermath.  
In order to make comparison between market CDS spreads and model estimates, observed 
CDS spreads are downloaded from Thomson Datastream, which are quoted in EUR, but to 
make a better comparison, EUR quoted spreads are converted into CHF using historical 
exchange rates, which is also obtained from Datastream.  
Being an over-the-counter derivative, CDS data are usually not available from most of the 
online database; we therefore rely on CDS data from Thomson Datastream. However, strictly 
speaking, a small but relevant problem with Datastream is that it does not provide the reader 
with reference from where it has gathered the spreads. However, since Datastream is a 
sufficient and well-known provider for financial data, it seems little reason to doubt its 
reliability. 
To implement the CreditGrades model, data on following variables are required: 
• Risk free rate ( 𝑟 ): our analysis uses five-year US Treasury rate as the risk free 
interest rate, which are obtained from the Federal Reserves online database. However, 
several authors have argued that the Treasury rate is too low as measure of risk free 
rate (Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein 2001, Longstaff 2004). For robustness test in the 
later section, we will carry out an analysis using SWAP as the risk free rate. 
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• Debt-per-share ( 𝐷 ): debt-per-share is calculated as the total liabilities divided by the 
number of common shares outstanding, with data collected from the latest annual 
financial reports available to the banks. The common shares adjusted for stock splits 
and other measures. However, we use long-term instead of total liabilities for banks 
because according to Löeffler & Posch (2011), for financial institutions, the debt 
calculation should be adjusted by excluding their financial subsidiaris. And for banks, 
the authors suggests that the total liabilities used for calculatig debt-per-share ratio 
should eliminat the short-term borrowings, in order to not overweight the value. But 
the total liability is used for calculation with non-financial companies. 
 
• Stock prices (  𝑆∗): historical stock price is an important input determining the CDS 
spreads, the equity prices are collected on a daily basis, which are close prices 
adjusted for dividends and splits downloaded from Thomson Datastream.  
In addition to the variables listed above, few more model specific parameters also need to be 
defined: 
• Maturity ( 𝑇 ): CDS spreads with five-year maturity are used, because five-year 
CDS contracts are considered to be the most liquid, and therefore are expected to 
provide the most accurate market spreads. (Rodrigues & Agarwal, 2011) 
 
• Equity volatility (  𝜎!  ): the historical stock volatility estimation method is used to 
implement the model, with standard one-year window length of estimation, 
assuming 250 trading days a year.  
 
• Total asset volatility (  𝜎  ): as clarified in the previous section, the total asset 
volatility is estimated following the CreditGrades Technical Document (Finger et 
al., 2002). 
 
• Debt specific recovery (𝑅  ): is set to be 0.5 as motivated in Finger et al. (2002). 
 
• Global recovery ( 𝐿 ): is recovery rate averaged over all debts and therefore is firm 
specific variable and thus obtained by calibrating parameters for each bank.  
 
• Percentage standard deviation of default barrier ( 𝜆 ): is the standard deviation of 
global recovery 𝐿, is also firm specific and calibrated together with 𝐿. 
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Finger et al. (2002) finds that a 1000-day estimation provides good results for five-year CDS 
contracts using implied volatility. However, the choice made for this study is using standard 
one-year estimation window with historical equity volatility, which is the same as the study 
from Byström (2006). Furthermore, our calculation of debt-per-share ratio is simplified 
comparing to the more complex definition mentioned in Finger et al. (2002), but the validity 
of our method is confirmed by some other studies, for instance Schweikhard and 
Tsesmelidakis (2011), and Yu (2006). 
The Merton (1974) model defines the event of default as when the value of the firm’s asset 
falls below its debt, or in terms of accounting ratios, default occurs when the financial 
leverage ratio of a firm approaches one. In other words, all else being equal, ‘the default 
probability and the credit spread increase monotonically in the leverage ratio’ (Schweikhard 
& Tsesmelidakis, 2011). As pointed out in other studies, financial leverage ratio plays an 
important role in determining the goodness of model prediction on credit spreads. However, 
bias may arise that affects the prediction, since the asset and equity volatility is usually 
unobservable, but covariate with the degree of leverage (Eom & Huang, 2004).  
For financial institutions, the leverage ratio is rather difficult to assess, because their stock 
market data only gives information on the equity part while debt is usually estimated by its 
book value. And thus financial leverage expressed as dividing the value of the debt by the 
firm’s asset is imprecise, since the majority of debt for financial institutions are insured and 
thus should not be counted when valuing the notion of leverage. To address this issue, our 
study allows justification on the leverage ratio by calibrating the parameters using market data 
on CDS spreads, which is differed from Finger et al. (2002) but used in studies like 
Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2012), Yu (2006) and Byström (2006).   
In the CreditGrades model, the total asset volatility is expressed as a linear relation with the 
default barrier 𝐿𝐷. Instead of using only the book value of debt 𝐷, we accommodate the 
model to fit the market data by allowing global recovery, 𝐿 and its standard deviation 𝜆 to 
vary while minimizing the sum of squared errors between the model (𝐶𝐷𝑆) and market 
spreads (𝐶𝐷𝑆). Specifically, the calibration is performed using data one-month prior to the 
sample period, which is before the crisis has launched.  
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min!!,!! (𝐶𝐷𝑆!,! 𝐿! , 𝜆! − 𝐶𝐷𝑆!,!)!!!!!  
To be mentioned, instead of adjusting the leverage ratio and default barrier endogenously as 
in Yu (2006) and Byström (2006), the CreditGrades Technical Document sets 𝐿 exogenously 
to 0.5 and 𝜆 to 0.3 (Finger et al., 2002) 
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7 Empirical	  Results	  
In	   this	   section	   the	   results	   of	   our	  model	   estimates	   are	   presented	   and	   compared	  with	   the	  
market	  observed	  CDS	  spreads.	  Starting	  off	  with	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  CDS	  spreads	  before	  
and	   during	   the	   crisis	   2007-­‐2009,	   then	   the	   empirical	   results	   for	   Swiss	   banks	   will	   be	  
presented	  and	  discussed	   in	   relation	  with	   the	   too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail	   impact,	   followed	  by	   remarks	  
from	  equal-­‐weighted	  indices	  for	  financial	  and	  non-­‐financial	  sectors.	  Eventually,	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  section,	  we	  test	  for	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  CreditGrades	  model.	  	  
7.1 Descriptive	  Statistics	  
In Switzerland, the banking system consists of Swiss National Bank (SNB), as well as a 
private banking sector. Among the regional banks of the private banking sector, UBS and 
Credit Suisse are the two largest, and also are the only banks with available CDS contracts. In 
order to give an intuitive understanding on how the recent crisis has impacts on the credit 
market, the descriptive statistics on Table 1 below shows the CDS data of these two, which 
covers both the pre- and crisis period. 
Table	  1:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  Banks	  
	  	   	  	   Observations	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev	   Max	   Min	  Pre-­‐Crisis	  	   UBS	   650	   12,05	   3,89	   22,41	   6,36	  (Jan	  2005-­‐Jun	  2007)	   Credit	  Suisse	   650	   23,41	   5,61	   39,34	   14,68	  Crisis	  period	  	   UBS	   720	   181,49	   107,12	   546,61	   17,43	  (Jul	  2007-­‐Mar	  2010)	   Credit	  Suisse	   720	   146,29	   71,37	   394,42	   29,05	  
 
As can be seen from the table, during the pre-crisis period, the CDS spreads are rather 
moderate in comparison with the crisis period, where the spreads increase dramatically with 
significantly higher standard deviations for both banks. As well as the mean value of the 
spreads, for UBS, the CDS spreads before crisis was 12.05 bps, which increases to 181.49 bps 
for more than ten times growth. Whereas for Credit Suisse, the CDS spreads increase 
significantly from 23.41 bps to 146.29 bps; higher spreads reflect greater risk perceived by the 
investors about the market. For graphic descriptions, the comparison of market CDS spreads 
for two banks during the crisis is presented in Figure 2; evidently, they both grow 
considerably even with record peaks, but rather move in tandem during the same period. 
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When looking at the levels, UBS trades CDS contracts relatively higher than Credit Suisse 
with much higher peaks during and after the crisis. 
 
Figure	  2:	  Market	  CDS	  Spreads	  for	  UBS	  and	  Credit	  Suisse	  
Besides these two largest banks, an equal-weighted (investing equal amounts in each stock) 
non-financial index consists of large Swiss firms was created to compare with the banks on 
their CDS contracts. The equal-weighted methodology for composing the index was used as 
in Byström (2006) who examines the predictability of CreditGrades model on CDS spreads. 
The choice of companies were made by following the criteria that they have to be publicly 
traded with CDS contracts signed. Companies included in the index are: Nestlé S.A., Novartis 
International AG, Roche Holding AG, ABB Ltd., Adecco S.A., Holcim Ltd., Swisscom AG. 
With the companies included, the index covers industries of agriculture and food, chemical 
and pharmaceutical, engineering, construction materials as well as telecommunications. The 
data collection are the same as for the banks but only covers the crisis period, and the pre-
crisis period was excluded due to the unavailability of data.  
In order to highlight the differences between financial and non-financial companies of their 
performance on the credit markets, another equal-weighted financial index containing the two 
largest Swiss banks (UBS and Credit Suisse) is constructed. See table 2 below for descriptive 
statistics, and the figure 3 shows a time series plot of the two indices. 
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Table	  2:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  Indices	  
	  	   	  	   Observations	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev	   Max	   Min	  Crisis	  period	   Financial	  Index	   720	   163,89	   87,75	   469,43	   23,24	  (Jul	  2007-­‐Mar	  2010)	   Non-­‐Financial	  Index	   720	   149,04	   89,92	   435,86	   28,02	  
 
 
Figure	  3:	  Market	  CDS	  Spreads	  for	  Financial	  and	  Non-­‐Financial	  Indices 
Both financial and non-financial index give comparable CDS spreads with almost same 
standard deviations and mean values. However, the spreads for financial index have more 
intensive reactions to the financial events as indicated by sudden increases on the spreads.  
7.2 Calibration	  Results	  
Finger et al. (2006) sets model parameters 𝐿 and 𝜆 exogenously to 0.5 and 0.3. However, the 
calibration process from our study gields different results:  
Table	  3:	  Calibration	  Results	  for	  Indices 	  	   𝐿	  	   	  𝜆	  Financial	  Index	   0.21	   0.29	  Non-­‐Financial	  Index	   0.79	   0.72	  
Our calibration results are lower for financial index but substantially higher for non-financial 
index in comparison with Finger et al. (2002). The lower values for financial sectors are 
expected due to distinctive liability structures and specific government regulations imposed 
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on banks, which intends to reduce their asset volatilities (Schweikhard & Tsesmelidakis, 
2011). The higher calibration results for non-financial sector are though unexpected but are in 
line with findings in Byström (2006). Furthermore, Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2012) 
and Yu (2005) have calibration results close to one for the model parameter 𝐿, which is also 
consistent in our results.  
In addition to the calibration results, the relative deviation between model estimates and 
market spreads is introduced as a relative measure to address the too-big-to-fail impact. The 
relative deviations are named ‘residuals’ and is defined as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙! =   𝐶𝐷𝑆! − 𝐶𝐷𝑆!𝐶𝐷𝑆!  
Where 𝐶𝐷𝑆!  is the CreditGrades model estimation, and 𝐶𝐷𝑆!  represents observed market 
spreads. The residuals for banks are included in Appendix A. 
7.3 Swiss	  Banks	  
The repercussion of government intervention can be captured by the relative deviations, i.e. 
residuals. The effect of intervention arose due to the asymmetric treatment between debt and 
equity. In other words, when government bailout banks, the default expectations will be 
differed between shareholders and creditors, since the rescue action tends to favor creditors, 
therefore would have less impact on the stock-market implied model estimates, which in our 
case is the CreditGrades model. As a result, we would expect the market price of default risk 
denoted by the CDS spreads, to differ across debt and equity market; in the way that the 
model estimates exceed its counterpart market observed CDS spreads (Schweikhard & 
Tsesmelidakis, 2011), and thus signal for the too-big-to-fail impact. 
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Figure	  4:	  Model	  Estimation 
NOTE: For each of the graph, following events are marked: 
1. Taken over of Bear Steams; 2. Lehman Brother Bankruptcy; 3. Revised TARP Announcement;  
4. The SNB-StabFund; 5. Swiss Central Bank cuts rate; 6. Aftermath of the Crisis 
 
 
In general, our results indicate that the CreditGrades model tends to overestimate the CDS 
spreads during the most acute phase of the financial crisis, which in turn comply with the 
theory of diversified default expectations between debt and equity markets. However, the 
degree of overestimation differs for the two Swiss banks as indicated in Figure 4 above.    
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The bailout for Bear Stems as illustrated by the first line shifts the market spreads and the 
model estimates upward to a new peak. However, after the bailout, the CDS spreads start to 
decrease and returned to the same basis points, even though the peak for market spreads was 
higher. Since the model estimate and market spread increase simultaneously, which indicates 
no immediate market respond and government intervenes discovered, and thus no clear 
evidence for too-big-to-fail. Moreover, in fact, during that period, the banks in Switzerland 
were not yet in trouble until the Lehman Brother filed for bankruptcy on the 15th of 
September, which gives another shock to the credit market as illustrated in the second line.  
Surprisingly, the immediate effect on the failure of Lehman Brother is not significant; the 
market shows higher spreads than the model estimates. But it all changes at the third line, 
which demonstrate the government intervention in the US through the revision of TARP, and 
the setup of SNB StabFund in Switzerland as indicated in the fourth line. Starting with the 
revised TARP, the model estimate starts to overestimate the CDS spreads with increasing 
residuals. Considering the TARP and SNB StabFund as government bailout schemes, the 
subsequent overestimation on CDS spreads is worth discussing. When the US government 
announced the revised TARP plan, the expected further collapses on banks in the US were 
probably to decrease. And since the US financial market are very much interconnected with 
the market in Switzerland, the lower market risk results downward movement on the CDS 
spreads for both banks. But the reduction was more significant for UBS that the market 
spreads drops from 400bps to somewhere below 200bps. The greater impact on UBS was 
because its growing trades in the US mortgage securities, and the bank’s illiquid stake on the 
US mortgage market, which makes the bank less easily to sold off as the times got tough in 
the US..  
As a result, due to its sub-prime related investments, UBS was the first top-flight banks 
announce losses, USD 3.4 billion by the beginning of October in 2008. Thus on the 14th of 
October, the bank requested government support to overcome the distress. After much 
discussion, the SNB announced the agreement of SNB-StabFund by the time of October 16, 
2008, which injects USD 5.2 billion worth capital into the bank meanwhile transfer up to 
USD 38.7 billion ‘toxic’ assets to another legal entity created to isolate the bank’s financial 
risk (Stability Report, 2009). Immediate after the government intervention, the market spreads 
for CDS contracts continuous to increase but at a slower pace in comparison with the model 
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estimates, which generates large relative deviation captured by the positive residuals, whereas 
the probability of default continuous to increase, but not as much as the model predicts.  
For Credit Suisse, the second largest bank in Switzerland, our results show that the 
overestimation is also found between model estimates and market spreads on CDS contracts, 
but with smaller residuals than for UBS. The SNB Financial Stability Reports (2009) pointed 
out that even though both UBS and Credit Suisse took measures to strengthen their resilience, 
but unlike UBS, Credit Suisse is less tied to the US mortgage problems, and thus less affected 
by the crisis. “In addition to reducing risky positions and overall size of their trading 
portfolios and balance sheet, they raise sizeable amounts of capital” and most importantly, 
“Credit Suisse managed to overcome the distress without financial support from the public 
sector.” (Stability Report 2009) In fact it also explains that Credit Suisse represents much 
larger residuals when the SNB cuts rates to 0.5%, which is indicated by the fifth line. Because 
lower interest rate tends to encourage larger investment, so that to bring itself together, Credit 
Suisse Group AG raises USD 8.8 billion capital from “a small group of major global 
investors” including the Qatar Investment Authority. (Logutenkova & Giles, 2008)  
During the peak session of the recent sub-prime financial crisis, for both banks the larger 
overestimation between modeled and market CDS spreads, approves the too-big-to-fail 
impact which can be explained as: to prevent the largest banks in Switzerland from going 
bankruptcy was crucial for the country’s national insistence on independence (Schubert, 
2011). The interconnected roles of these two largest banks in Switzerland are in great 
importance for the economy; the Swiss government had to take measurements and help the 
banks meet tighter capital rules, because letting them fail would hurt the small mountainous 
country so badly.  
The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis is also worth mentioning since the impacts of 
government intervention are still in presence. As indicated in Figure 5, the mispricing of 
model estimates differs considerably between UBS and Credit Suisse. Less issue arose for 
Credit Suisse where the model and market spreads for CDS move simultaneously with little 
residuals. One possible explanation could be that instead of getting direct capital injections 
from the government, Credit Suisse survived from the crisis through raising capital from the 
investors. Whereas with injections from SNB, the probability of default for UBS decreases as 
indicated by much lower market CDS spreads, the large deviation between market and model 
spreads, which results significant positive residuals as can be seen in Appendix A. 
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7.4 Financial	  and	  non-­‐financial	  indices	  
Two indices are constructed to highlight the differences between banks and non-financial 
companies as illustrated in Figure 5. During the most acute phase of the financial crisis, the 
model consistently underestimates the CDS spreads for the non-financial sector. The outcome 
is not surprising but happens to be the standard results by using structural models, as the 
model used in our study; the CreditGrades model (Rodrigues & Agarwal, 2011). The liquidity 
premium in the CDS market explains the observed underestimation (Schweikhard & 
Tsesmelidakis, 2011). And in addition, Rodrigues and Agarwal (2011) mentioned that there 
are additional counterparty credit risks not captured by the structural models so that the model 
under-performs for non-financial firms. Although the model estimates increase less than the 
market data, but the simultaneous movements in between still indicate a certain degree of 
pricing efficiency (Byström, 2006). Which also gives evidence of a strong link between the 
stock market and the risk market, as measured by CDS spreads. In addition, it also indicates 
the existence of consistency between market and model pricing on CDS contracts for both 
financial and non-financial companies. 
The overestimation of CDS spreads for financial index is somewhat more interesting to 
discuss, as well as the difference in residuals between indices. Our results in Figure 5 suggest 
that the actions undertaken by the Swiss government to bailout the banks had a significant 
impact on their default probability, and as expected creates asymmetric default expectations 
between shareholders and creditors, is also comply with the too-big-to-fail impact.  
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Figure	  5:	  Model	  Estimates	  and	  Market	  Spreads	  for	  Indices 
NOTE: For each of the graph, following events are marked: 
1. Taken over of Bear Steams; 2. Lehman Brother Bankruptcy; 3. Revised TARP Announcement;  
4. The SNB-StabFund; 5. Swiss Central Bank cuts rate; 6. Aftermath of the Crisis 
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7.5 Test	  for	  Robustness	  
The model predicted CDS spreads depend on how the CreditGrades model is implemented. 
For instance, the equity volatility can be estimated using historical volatility as we did in this 
study with standard one-year estimation window. However, some study has advocated using 
longer estimation period, therefore, in order to address this issue, we will test the model using 
historical 1000-day equity volatility. The one-year estimation window was chosen as in the 
study carried out by Byström (2006). Nevertheless, longer estimation window may capture 
more information. As the model estimated results attached in Appendix B, longer estimation 
horizon would incorporate less volatile CDS spreads estimated, since the volatility is higher 
the longer estimation window is. Furthermore, another method to estimate is using the 
implied volatility, which is not used in this study, but can be done for further research to 
provide more forward looking volatility. 
Another issue related to the model estimation is the risk-free rate; our study uses the US five-
year Treasury rate the same as the original model from the CreditGrade Technical Document 
(Finger et al., 2002). However, Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2012) argues that this rate 
may imply a too low interest rate compare to the true value, due to the existence of the 
forward liquidity and tax related issues. To get more accurate estimation, we test the model 
again with the five-year SWAP rate, with data also acquired from Datastream. The estimated 
results are reported in Appendix C. Changing in the risk-free rate improves the model 
prediction, but the effect is negligible. However, using SWAP rate can be doubtful due to the 
counter-party risk, so we may conclude that using five-year Treasury rate as in this study 
nevertheless provides reasonably good model estimation. 
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8 Conclusion	  
The sub-prime financial crisis 2007-2009 impelled government intervention in the market, 
through capital injection, provide guarantees for debts, or backup the toxic assets in order to 
help large interconnected financial institutions overcome the distress. Thus, the purpose of 
this paper is to examine the existence of the too-big-to-fail impact on the Swiss banking 
sector during the recent crisis as a result of government intervention. The examination is 
carried out by comparing the market observed CDS spreads and the stock market implied 
CreditGrades model spreads, for both the largest Swiss banks and two equal weighted indices. 
With one index consisting of two largest Swiss banks and the other with non-financial 
companies in Switzerland. 
For the two banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, overestimation of modelled CDS spreads is 
discovered during the most acute period of the crisis, which indicates the presence of too-big-
to-fail impact and thus positive residuals in times of government bailout. While for UBS, the 
largest bank in Switzerland, there is a tendency for the bank to be affected to a greater extent, 
as indicated by rather small overestimation of model estimates during the crisis, but followed 
by much larger positive residuals during the crisis aftermath period. As for Credit Suisse, 
overestimation is only observed during the most acute phase of the crisis, whereas no 
significant deviations between model and market observed spreads were found during the 
subsequent period. One possible explanation is that, Credit Suisse is not closely tied to US 
mortgage problems, unlike UBS, who was severely affected by the financial crisis due to its 
large investment in the US mortgage securities. As for the two indices, overestimation was 
found for the financial index as the same for the two individual banks, whereas 
underestimated model spreads was observed for non-financial index, this is because some of 
the additional credit risks are linked to the non-financial companies, however the structural 
model might fail to capture these risks. 
As a result, we conclude that the government intervention does change the default 
expectations between shareholders and creditors, which are captured by deviations between 
the market observed spreads and stock market implied CreditGrades spreads. In addition, our 
conclusion is in line with the study carried out by Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2011), 
which illustrates that government bailout or rescue actions create model deviations which 
indicate the existence of too-big-to-fail impact. However, too-big-to-fail is a subject with 
39	  	  
controversy, for instance the topics of too-big-to-save and moral hazard, which may indicate 
higher risk for the financial institutions, and negative externalities for the government and the 
public, and thus ought to attract great attentions from the regulators. 
For the study carried our in this paper, there is one limitation that is the reliability of the 
CreditGrades model, since the predicted results are highly depend on the performance of the 
model. Although the model is considered to be well-established and efficient to estimate CDS 
spreads, strictly speaking, this issue can still be considered as a weakness. Another limitation 
has to be mentioned is that there are only two banks included in the study, because CDS 
contracts are only available for the two largest Swiss banks. The results would be 
strengthened and easier to identify the too-big-to-fail impact if smaller banks are involved to 
make a comparison with large banks.   
The results of this study are build upon the CreditGrades model as one of the structural 
models, however, for further research, including model estimates from more structural models 
would reduce the dependency on the model prediction and produce more reliable results. On 
the other hand, to capture the degree of too-big-to-fail impact, further research could devote to 
calculate the price of a too-big-to-fail premium, and how it contributes to minimizing the 
issues with negative externalities and moral hazard.  
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Appendix	  A	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  6:	  Deviations	  of	  Model	  Estimates	  from	  the	  Market	  Spreads	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Appendix	  B	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  7:	  1000-­‐Day	  Volatility	  Estimation	  Window	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Appendix	  C	  	  	  	  
	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  8:	  Five-­‐year	  SWAP	  Rate	  as	  the	  Risk-­‐free	  Interest	  Rate	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